Background: Genomic analysis may reveal both primary and secondary findings with direct relevance to the health of probands’ biological relatives. Researchers question their obligations to return findings not only to participants but also to family members. Given the social value of privacy protection, should researchers offer a proband’s results to family members, including after the proband’s death? Methods: Preferences were elicited using interviews and a survey. Respondents included probands from two pancreatic cancer research resources, plus biological and nonbiological family members. (...) Hypothetical scenarios based on actual research findings from the two cancer research resources were presented; participants were asked return of results preferences and justifications. Interview transcripts were coded and analyzed; survey data were analyzed descriptively. Results: Fifty-one individuals (17 probands, 21 biological relatives, 13 spouses/partners) were interviewed. Subsequently, a mailed survey was returned by 464 probands, 1,040 biological family members, and 399 spouses/partners. This analysis highlights the interviews, augmented by survey findings. Probands and family members attribute great predictive power and lifesaving potential to genomic information. A majority hold that a proband’s genomic results relevant to family members’ health ought to be offered. While informants endorse each individual’s choice whether to learn results, most express a strong moral responsibility to know and to share, particularly with the younger generation. Most have few concerns about sharing genetic information within the family; rather, their concerns focus on the health consequences of not sharing. Conclusions: Although additional studies in diverse populations are needed, policies governing return of genomic results should consider how families understand genomic data, how they value confidentiality within the family, and whether they endorse an ethics of sharing. A focus on respect for individual privacy—without attention to how the broad social and cultural context shapes preferences within families—cannot be the sole foundation of policy. (shrink)

Whole eye transplantation (WET) remains experimental. Long presumed impossible, recent scientific advances regarding WET suggest that it may become a clinical reality. However, the ethical implications of WET as an experimental therapeutic strategy remain largely unexplored. This article evaluates the ethical considerations surrounding WET as an emerging experimental treatment for vision loss. A thorough review of published literature pertaining to WET was performed; ethical issues were identified during review of the articles.

This one-volume text in Christian ethics is an attempt by L. Harold DeWolf, Professor of Systematic Theology at Wesley Theological Seminary at a comprehensive treatment of contemporary ethical theory and practice. The author defines his subject within a specifically Christian context; traces the relativistic revolt against moral norms; gives a brief resume of Hebrew and Christian ethics; presents a rather rigorous interpretation of natural law theory; formulates a series of ethical guidelines based essentially on rational responsibility, consistency, ideal values, (...) social concern, and ultimate reality. He then indicates how through ecclesia and community these principles might be applied to such diverse problems as marriage and the family, environment, cultural depersonalization, civil disobedience and war. To those who feel that ethics should be a reasoned science free of theological commitment this work will seem too ambitious; to those who feel that existential ethical judgments should proceed from the total intellectual and religious resources of the individual, it will stand as an updated if necessarily diffuse outline of contemporary Christian ethical theory, formulated with insight and sensitivity.—R. P. M. (shrink)

We propose a model of unawareness that remains close to the paradigm of Aumann’s model for knowledge [R. J. Aumann, International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999) 263-300]: just as Aumann uses a correspondence on a state space to define an agent’s knowledge operator on events, we use a correspondence on a state space to define an agent’s awareness operator on events. This is made possible by three ideas. First, like the model of [A. Heifetz, M. Meier, and B. Schipper, (...) Journal of Economic Theory 130 (2006) 78-94], ours is based on a space of partial specifications of the world, partially ordered by a relation of further specification or refinement, and the idea that agents may be aware of some coarser-grained specifications while unaware of some finer-grained specifications; however, our model is based on a different implementation of this idea, related to forcing in set theory. Second, we depart from a tradition in the literature, initiated by [S. Modica and A. Rustichini, Theory and Decision 37 (1994) 107- 124] and adopted by Heifetz et al. and [J. Li, Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009) 977-993], of taking awareness to be definable in terms of knowledge. Third, we show that the negative conclusion of a well- known impossibility theorem concerning unawareness in [Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, Econometrica 66 (1998) 159-173] can be escaped by a slight weakening of a key axiom. Together these points demonstrate that a correspondence on a partial-state space is sufficient to model unawareness of events. Indeed, we prove a representation theorem showing that any abstract Boolean algebra equipped with awareness, knowledge, and belief operators satisfying some plausible axioms is representable as the algebra of events arising from a partial-state space with awareness, knowledge, and belief correspondences. (shrink)

Purpose. The article is devoted to the analysis of corporality as an attribute of plastic art in the Ancient art, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the modernism and the postmodernism. Theoretical basis. The authors consider historical development of the art as a change of paradigms. Within each paradigm a special understanding of art is created, which is characterized both by the act of creativity itself and by the evaluation of its results. Particularly urgent is the task to identify the origins (...) of these changes, to indicate their stages, the direction of the evolution of artistic creativity. In this context, corporality as a paradigm of European plastic art is considered in the article in the concrete historical dimension from the classics to the postmodernism. Originality. Postmodern experiments stimulate blurring the borders between the traditional forms and genres of art. Review of canonical ideas about the creation and destruction, order and chaos in art illustrates conscious reorientation from the classical understanding of artistic creativity to the construction of artifacts-simulacra, which is a characteristic feature in the oeuvre of contemporary artists, ranging from the pop art to the present day. Conclusions. The ideas of postmodern philosophers found their visual embodiment in modern artistic practices. Reconstruction of the body, re-switching of its elements according to the principle of chaotic collage, the interpretation of the human body as a separate substance isolated from the individual him/herself, which is presented as a phenomenon of mass culture, became the basis of the creative method of contemporary plastic art. The ideas of postmodern philosophers have found their visual embodiment in the contemporary artistic practices. (shrink)

Many of the papers in this volume originated in a colloquium at the University of Western Ontario in 1967. These include a paper on the logic of norms by G. H. Von Wright, a paper on the logic of questions by L. Åqvist, a paper on the logic of belief by W. Sellars, and a paper on inductive logic by R. Ackermann. The commentaries by Anderson and Sosa have been revised for the volume and a further commentary to Ackermann's paper (...) by Wesley Salmon has been added. In addition to the colloquium papers a number of further papers are published here for the first time: J. Hintikka on the semantics of propositional attitudes, R. Hilpinen on relativized modalities, C. Harrison on the unanticipated examiner and H. Smokler and M. Rohr on confirmation and translation. The volume is completed by two papers published in Synthese and a well-known paper in modal logic by Lemmon, Meredith, Meredith, Prior, and Thomas published complete with a new postscript by Prior. Although the collection is somewhat haphazard and seems to have no unifying theme, philosophers interested in these topics in philosophical logic will be thankful for the availability of the papers, both old and new.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A. I. Melden’s earlier writings suggested that the justification for a given moral right is simply the social institution or context in which that right characteristically was involved: "the right that A has is the right that is his moral status or role with respect to B". On this view there is no justification for such rights independent of what can be provided by the particular practices in which they are embedded. Thus, to determine and ultimately to justify the respective (...) moral rights of parents and their children we should look to the "language game" in which they are mutually involved—that of family life—for this is the context in which rights and obligations of this sort have their primary and peculiar place. (shrink)

Philosophers committed to the task of coming to grips with reality must face the fact that there are no final solutions and the need to question is fundamental to their project. Taking this as his point of departure Clark proposes that questioning is not confined to the philosopher; it marks every self that is confronted with a given empirical order. Before rendering an analysis of the experience of questioning which is the main thrust of this work, Clark outlines the situation (...) of knowledge in which we find two prevailing viewpoints, the spectator approach, and the performative approach. In the former a subjectivism ensues when the knower passively receives the objects creating a solipsistic prison where the objects take residence precluding any response to the world. In this sense there is no appropriation of meanings as "mine." Clark maintains that this is not what occurs. The self does not merely stand against a world of objects, rather through his intentions he modifies the data conferring meaning on it and in doing so validates his own self. The performative account acknowledges the knower as an active constituting agent who not only intends the facts but uses them in his effort to become a self. A series of historical studies is presented examining these two viewpoints in such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, the empiricists, and finally ending with Kant who represents the synthesis of both perspectives. Using the Critiques as his source, Clark suggests that while the theoretical reason of Kant is a spectator approach, practical reason incorporates the performative account where the "I can" verifies the active self who is responsible for its realization. Kant’s endeavor to construct a transcendental analysis is seen by Clark as primarily an enterprise to set up the necessary conditions for knowledge which can be applied in the practical order. The self only questions for a reason, so that it "can" do something. The "I can" presupposes the "I know," but the "I know" presupposes the "I ask." Clark proposes his own transcendental analysis of questioning and asks what structures are necessary for the experience of questioning in general with total disregard for the content of that question. He attempts to show that the experience involves self discovery, for what is revealed will only be revealed through further self questioning which is always subject to modification. Questioning is a unique and personal response to a world in which I find myself and yet I intend the world, bestowing on it the meaning that is necessary for my fulfillment. There is an analogy between this transcendental analysis and Kant’s, although Clark is quick to point out that he has hesitations about Kant’s treatment of time and space which he has somewhat modified to serve as the necessary structures of the experience of questioning. Philosophy has been pregnant with analyses of the self primarily as a knowing agent and perhaps it is now time for a movement towards the direction that Clark is suggesting. This book may provide the stimulus for more thought on the self as a questioner.—K. R. M. (shrink)

This provocative book provides a stimulating study of the self that is somewhat reminiscent of Husserl’s transcendental ego. But for Earle the ego is absolute and infinite, yet so unique and singular that it precludes any descriptive analysis in terms of a universal structure. As the primary and absolute source of objectification the ego is opposed to these "others" to which something "happens" as the necessary is opposed to the contingent. The realm of happening is the realm of existence, and (...) the ego as the constitutive agent of objects and their meanings transcends this world, and in this sense is non-existent. Yet it is, and its mode of being is "eternity." Paradoxically, the self is both absolute and independent, but so relatively dependent on others for its fulfillment that it can only realize itself as a person on the level of intersubjectivity and most significantly in transcendental love. Earle remains insistent on the incommunicability and singularity of the I and maintains that if there is no common nature in which the I partakes neither is there any universal or abstract moral ought. Value is transcendentally grounded and is what I choose it to be and what I decide ought to be. There are some valuable critical accounts found in this work on Husserl, Sartre, and a very fine in depth refutation of James’ theory of memory. For Earle memory is the one essential way for the transcendental ego to preserve itself "amid the distraction and chaos of its chosen existence." The last two chapters are devoted to a phenomenology of horror and death, and although it is somewhat unrelated to the main topic it does make interesting reading. The book is replete with rich material for critical thinking and offers a challenge to investigate the self from a new and what may appear to some a radical approach. An index facilitates the reading.—K. R. M. (shrink)

The position of the United Methodist Church on end-of-life decisions is best described as intentional ambiguity or ambiguous intentions or both. The paper analyzes the official position of the denomination and then considers the actions of a U.M.C. bishop who served as a foreman for a trial of Dr. Jack Kevorkian. In an effort to find some common ground within an increasingly divided denomination, the work concludes with a consideration of the work of John Wesley and his approach to (...) human death. (shrink)

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

[R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...) no adequate account of 'really', and I point to unclarities in Wiggins's similar, but distinct, attempt to use 'really' in the logical form of true negative existentials. /// [David Wiggins] Evans was not wrong (I maintain) to say that the senses of genuine proper names invoke and require objects. Names in fiction or hypothesis mimic such names. Pace Evans, Sainsbury and free logicians, proper names are scopeless. (Evans's 'Julius' is not a name.) Names create a presumption of existential generalization. In sentences such as 'Vulcan does not really exist', that presumption is bracketed. The sentence specifies by reference to story or report a concept identical with Vulcan and declares it be really uninstantiated. (The sentence, which partakes of play, is a kind of palimpsest.) It is explained why this second level view of 'exists' is to be preferred. (shrink)

Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004b) and others have demonstrated the surprising fact that the valence of a side-effect action can affect intuitions about whether that action was performed intentionally. Here we report the results of an experiment that extends these findings by testing for an analogous effect regarding knowledge attributions. Our results suggest that subjects are less likely to find that an agent knows an action will bring about a side-effect when the effect is good than when it is bad. It (...) is further argued that these findings, while preliminary, have important implications for recent debates within epistemology about the relationship between knowledge and action. (shrink)

I had a strange dream, or half-waking vision, not long ago. I found myself at the top of a mountain in the mist, feeling very pleased with myself, not just for having climbed the mountain, but for having achieved my life's ambition, to find a way of answering moral questions rationally. But as I was preening myself on this achievement, the mist began to clear, and I saw that I was surrounded on the mountain top by the graves of all (...) those other philosophers, great and small, who had had the same ambition, and thought they had achieved it. And I have come to see, reflecting on my dream, that, ever since, the hard-working philosophical worms have been nibbling away at their systems and showing that the achievement was an illusion. True, their skeletons, indigestible to worms, remained, and were surprisingly similar to one another. But I was led to think again about what one can, and what one cannot, achieve in this direction. (shrink)

This book consists of four major papers written by Peter Achinstein, Peter Geach, Wesley Salmon, and J. L. Mackie. Each of the papers has two commentaries. Achinstein’s paper is commented on by Mary Hesse and R. Harré; Geach’s paper, by Peter Winch and Grete Henry; Salmon’s paper, by D. H. Mellor and L. Jonathan Cohen; Mackie’s paper, by Renford Bambrough and Martin Hollis. Each author of the original paper then replies to his two commentators. All four papers are concerned (...) with some aspect of the concept of explanation. Achinstein’s and Salmon’s papers are extensions and justifications of their previous work. For example, Salmon has argued against Hempel’s account of scientific explanation and has maintained that certain scientific explanations are not arguments of any kind, and that consequently they need not embody the high probabilities that would be required to provide reasonable ground for expectation of the event to be explained. He argues instead that a statistical explanation of a particular event "consists of an assemblage of factors relevant to the occurrence or non-occurrence of the event to be explained, along with the associated probability values". He indicates in the present volume that he does not wish to create the impression "that ability to transmit a mark is any mysterious kind of necessary connection or ‘power’ of the sort Hume criticized in Locke". There is little likelihood that Salmon would be misconstrued in this way. Also there is recent literature to the effect that Locke was clearer on the issues of causality than Hume and that there is nothing "mysterious" in Locke’s notion of powerful particulars. Why are they any more mysterious than the passive particulars preferred by Humeans? (shrink)